An Examination of Ad Attitude’s Cognitive and Affective Dimensions With Political Advertising: Television versus Print Media

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Abstract

Television advertising for political campaigns now dominates all other media, both in the U.S. and internationally. However, early research in ad attitude and political advertising primarily utilized print media so this research examines whether there is a difference between the two. Using ads for U.S. presidential candidates, the cognitive and affective components of ad attitude were examined for differences between two media – television and print, and for two ad treatments – positive and negative content/tone. Results showed that the Cognitive, or credible/believablenotional, component of ad attitude was statistically significant for the negative tone ads between the print and television ad versions. The Affect, or feeling-based, component of ad attitude was not found to be statistically different between television and print ads. The implications for U.S. and international practitioners are discussed.

Keywords: Ad Attitude, Negative Ads, Political Ads, TV vs. Print, Promotion, Advertising.

1. Introduction

The sheer dollar volume of advertising is a testament to business’ perceived value of the different media in reaching their desired audiences. In the U.S., ad spending for 2012 was $166 billion, with television getting the largest share at 39%. Print and online advertising are second, both at 21% (Ovide and Bensinger, 2012). Politicians and their media consultants – often from the ranks of product and services advertising – have adopted mass media buys as more efficient vehicles for communicating a limited-content, image-positioning message. Political races have ballooned into giant media buys as they often buy up all available media time in the few weeks before an election (Vanacore, 2010), especially in battleground states during a close election (Friedman, 2011). The number of ads blasted at voters has increased as fast as the dollars. For example, in Orlando, Florida, an important state in all recent presidential elections, the number of political ads during the same August week went from zero in 2004, to 153 in 2008, to 1,863 in 2012 (Wilner, 2012). That was a twelve-fold increase from just one presidential race to the next.

During the 2012 presidential election, the two presidential campaigns spent $2.9 billion, with television getting 80-85% of that (Friedman, 2013). This exceeds the old record set in 2010 (with only congressional offices running) at $2.5 billion (McClellan, 2011) which broke the 2008 record at $1.6 billion (Friedman, 2012). Including the advertising by outside political action groups and trade associations, the 2012 total goes to nearly $10 billion (Pistulka, 2012; Delo, 2012). So we can clearly see two trends here – the increase in money spent and the increased use of television (Kaid and Dimitrova, 2005; Airne, 2005).

Political ad spending shows no signs of moderation. In 2005, an off-year of only gubernatorial and mayoral elections, it was estimated that $515 million was spent on television alone. Over $44 million of that was just for the New York mayoral race (TNS, 2005).

Another feature of political advertising is that the political ad “season” is becoming longer with each election (TNS, 2005). Candidates feel they must begin their advertising sooner, which puts pressure on their competitors to do the same. This may have been an advantage for President Obama, the only Democratic candidate in 2012. The Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, outspent the Democratic campaign – 55% of the $2.9 billion total – but had to wait until he was the party’s nominee before purchasing most of his ads.
However, the incumbent President was able to buy earlier, cheaper spots so while the total spent was less, Obama actually bought 10% more ads (Friedman, 2013).

All this money spent on various media points to the necessity of finding effective means of communicating positive messages and creating positive attitudes toward our candidate. However, political advertising increasingly relies on negative messages to construct negative information and negative feelings toward the political opponent(s). It’s doubtful that any politician has ever been an “evil reptilian kitten-eater from another planet,” but that is what Canada’s Tory election machine labeled Liberal Leader Dalton McGuinty, the Premier of Ontario, Canada, a few weeks before their election (Smith and Galloway, 2003). The campaign had been filled with negative advertising and insulting press releases, but this insult was so over-the-top that it generated only laughter toward the source rather than distress for the targeted candidate.

This example demonstrates that negative advertising is not isolated to the U.S. but is being exported worldwide, often because foreign candidates hire the same campus campaigns that work in the U.S. For example, Mark Penn, a strategist for Hillary Clinton in 2008, helped run incumbent Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko’s 2010 campaign and Paul Manafort, who worked on John McCain’s run in 2008, worked for one of the challengers, the winner Victor Yanukovych (Vogel and Smith, 2009). Other countries “helped” by American political consultants include Argentina, Bulgaria, Romania, Israel, and Britain (Vogel and Smith, 2009). These and many other countries are finding negative political advertising more prevalent even if a consensus has not developed about its usefulness. In Taiwan, a study has shown that both positive and negative political ads polarized party members toward their own candidate and away from the opponent, respectively (Chang, 2003). In the United Kingdom, in contrast to the U.S., it’s believed that negative political advertising is more likely to drive voters toward the opposition and to think badly of the party slingng the mud (Murphy, 1996: “Negative,” 2001). However, negative advertising still has a strong history in the U.K. From ad man Maurice Saatchi’s “low-blow” posters in 1979 that are credited as a crucial factor in the Tory party’s win for Margaret Thatcher, to more recent attacks by McCann-Erickson on behalf of the Labour party (Murphy, 1996). Indeed, the U.K.’s Advertising Standards Authority has had to step in to stop the use of certain offensive posters (Economist, 1996).

Fletcher (2001) thinks that because the New Labour and the Tory parties are so indistinguishable, with no unique objectives between them that lead the politicians to rely so heavily on the negative. He also feels that it is due to the nature of having only two strong parties, and that negative advertising is rarer in countries with several parties and proportional representation. Perhaps, but it is clear that in Canada, the U.K., the U.S., and elsewhere, the use of negative political advertising is strong, and getting stronger (Cuneo, 2006). This study investigates whether the use of negative or positive advertising will differ by medium.

Negative political advertising is receiving a substantial amount of attention by both academics and practitioners. The use of negative advertising is increasing and their impact on the political process is worrying. One study (Teinowitz, 2004) showed that for October of 2002 (the last full month before the November non-presidential election), 35% of candidate ads, 72% of political party ads, and 36% of independent committee ads were negative. The social scientists who worry about the negativity of the political process on liberal democracies (e.g. Dermody and Scullion, 2003) usually adopt macro, or normative, arguments. Arguments such as generally driving voters away from the voting booth (evidenced by low turnouts), and generally driving negative attitudes towards politicians (shown by their low respectability in public polling). The practitioners, on the other hand, work in the micro world of getting their individual politicians elected and will use the tools that they think work.

The importance and impact of political advertising is reflected by the campaigns' willingness to spend ever more on advertising as discussed earlier. The tenor of the advertising has increasingly become more negative, and polls consistently show that the public dislikes this type of advertising. The use of negative advertising is supposed to hurt the sponsor by driving up feelings of negativity toward the sponsor (Hill, 1989) or even driving the voter into the arms of the competitor (Hockstader and Nosssiter, 2002; “Negative,” 2001; Jasperson and Fan, 2002). However, research has also shown that these negative ads are useful to convince existing voters to stay loyal (Fletcher, 2001), because they cognitively are more believable to voters (Robideaux, 1998), because they avoid source derogation (Meirick, 2002), and even because they benefit from the sleeper effect found in other disliked advertising (Lariscy and Tinkham, 1999). Negative ads are often called “informational ads” by their creators. These creators are not alone in believing that negative ads are useful in disclosing the true nature of candidates, but it is usually the opponent – not the sponsor – that one’s ads are telling the “truth” about (Feder, 2000).
Many studies then, find that negative political advertising works at some level, but they usually look at print advertising only (e.g. Pinkleton, 1998; Robideaux, 2004; Merritt, 1984). As shown earlier though, the preponderance of advertising is moving toward television (Friedman, 2013). On what support then do political strategists continue to believe that negative ads are essential (Abbe et. al., 2000) and that research results found for print are still valid for television? This study will examine how the attitudes toward these negative versus positive political ads differ depending on whether the political ad is in print or on television.

This study will use Ad Attitude measurements for print versus television since ad attitude has already been examined in its cognitive and affective subcomponents (e.g. Robideaux, 2004). Also useful, the means of those components provide an indication of the direction – positive versus negative – of the attitude of the subject toward the ad’s sponsor. This study will examine political ads for the reaction to the rational/cognitive and the emotional/affect aspects of print and television ads for differences. Two treatments will also be examined: political ads which are Sponsor-Positive in tone and content, and political ads which are Opponent-Negative in tone and content.

1.1 Ad Attitude and Political Ads

Attitude has received more attention than any other construct in consumer research (Erevelles, 1998), and is defined as “a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner in respect to a given object” (Runyon and Stewart, 1987, p. 460) or as “an individual’s internal evaluation of an object such as a branded product” (Mitchell and Olson 1981, p. 318). Attitudes are composed of the dimensions of (1) affect or feeling, (2) cognition or beliefs, and (3) behavioral intent (Assael, 1998), and are expected to be stable over time.

We define Ad Attitude (A_{ad}) as an attitude toward an advertisement which will hopefully “leave consumers with a positive feeling after processing the ad” (Shimp, 1981, p.10-11). Ads generate moods and other subjective experiences (the affect component of attitude) during the ad exposure (Madden, Allen and Twible, 1988; Aylesworth and MacKenzie, 1998). Having a positive emotional response to an ad is not, however, the same as a positive cognitive evaluation of the ad (Stout and Rust, 1993). This is important because there are two relatively distinct dimensions of attitude toward the ad, one cognitive and the other emotional (Shimp, 1981; Vakratsas and Ambler, 1999).

In most studies, ad attitudes are only examined as an affective, emotional construct (Derbaix, 1995; Assael, 1998). But it has been found that ad attitude toward political advertising was composed of two attitude components, the affect/emotional (Ad-A) and the cognitive/belief (Ad-C) dimensions, and that the evaluations of ads would differ depending on different types of political ads (Robideaux, 1998). There are questions whether the cognition or affect play the dominant role in ad attitude, but the acceptance is that both will be present (Morris et. al., 2002).

Earlier studies investigating ad attitude generally used messages that were positively framed and designed to generate positive emotions (Homer and Yoon, 1992). However, political ads are often not positively framed and may use only negative elements. Some studies have found that these negative-only ads are not effective (e.g., Hill, 1989; Pinkleton, Um, and Austin, 2002) because the sponsor will be tainted by the negative feelings elicited by the ad. Some researchers (e.g. Hill, 1989) have treated negative political ads as similar to consumer-oriented “comparative” ads because comparative ads claim superiority for the sponsor and impute inferiority on the competitor (Merritt, 1984). However, “the goal of negative advertising is to push consumers away from the competitor” (Merritt, 1984, p. 27), so negative political ads have no positive or comparative message elements, only negative elements.

Both general product and political advertising seek to be persuasive by presenting themselves as rational-oriented and believable (a cognitive construct). General marketers’ positive and comparative ads ask consumers to logically, cognitively, conclude that the sponsor’s product is better and their competitors’ brands inferior. Negative political ads do not provide positive sponsor attributes; they only provide specific and/or general claims of the opponent’s inferior attributes. This informational goal of negative ads is expected to be represented in the cognitive evaluative dimension of attitude.

2. Purpose and Background

Ad attitude (A_{ad}), as an antecedent or moderator variable toward behavior and other attitudes and feelings, has been increasingly researched since 1981.
A meta-analysis examining comparative and noncomparative advertising research examined 77 studies, and concluded that comparative advertising was less believable (cognitive dimension) and had less favorable attitudes (generally on the affect dimension) than noncomparative advertising (Grewal, et. al. 1997). Other researchers (e.g. Meirick, 2002; O'Cass, 2002; Robideaux, 2002) have looked at the different component dimensions of ad attitude and come to different conclusions.

Hill (1989) investigated the use of comparative political advertising in the 1988 presidential race and attempted to evaluate ad attitude as a function of comparative or noncomparative political ads. Hill was attempting to find evidence for the perception that “negative ad campaigns are not effective” because “voters view negative ads critically” (Hill, 1989, pp. 14, 15) and “may reflect negatively on the ad sponsor, and may have little impact upon the opposing candidate . . . compared to sponsor-positive ads” (p. 20). Merritt (1984) suggested that the comparative ads were not as effective because the negative information in the ads lacked credibility. She also concluded that a “negative strategy [may reinforce] predispositions but does not attract voters to the candidate” (p. 37). Stevens (2012) offered that it was perhaps the arresting power of the negative tone that makes the negative ads seem to provide more information than positive ads, and not that more information is actually present.

These studies help explain why general advertisers hesitate to use comparative ads (Barry, 1993), but the politician-sponsor may be willing to lose some votes if the sponsor believes that he/she can cause a greater loss of votes for the competitor (Rickard, 1994). So the objective of a negative ad may not be to attract voters to the sponsor-candidate, but to drive them away from the opponent.

Most early measurements of $A_{ad}$ only investigated the affect portion of attitude, so it was not clear whether the studies' results would have been different by examining the cognitive-belief (Ad-C) and affect-emotional (Ad-A) portions of ad attitude separately. In both high- and low-involvement decisions, the cognitive component of attitude precedes the affect component (Assael, 1998), and that affect is derived from cognitive, attribute beliefs (Tinkham and Weaver-Lariscy, 1994; Desai and Mahajan, 1998). Therefore, ignoring the cognitive element of attitude allows researchers to miss the first, and perhaps most important, element of the attitude toward the ad.

Studies looking for differences between print and television advertisements for attitudes and credibility have been done, but not for ad attitude components toward political ads. Previous studies include looking for credibility of the medium (Moore and Rodgers, 2005), creativity with credibility (Dahlén 2005), ad avoidance (Speck and Elliott, 1997), low-involvement context (Pelsmacker and Gueens, 2002), and objectivity versus subjective message claims (Darley and Smith, 1993).

3. Hypotheses

Earlier studies using presidential campaigns’ print ads demonstrated that both the cognitive and affective components of ad attitude were present and statistically different to warrant separate examination (e.g. Robideaux, 1998 and 2004). The earlier study found that positive-only and negative-only ad arguments were statistically different. This study will examine these ad attitude dimensions along the same positive versus negative ad content to see if these two ad attitude dimensions are still present, but will also examine them to see if they differ by medium.

Hypothesis One will look to see if the components of affect and cognition are still present and statistically different, representing a partial replication of earlier studies. Hypotheses Two and Three will look at both components to see if the components of ad attitude are statistically different for print ads versus television ads for each of the two ad treatments – positive and negative toned ads. Ads were designated as: Positive (for Sponsor-Positive only ads); and Negative (for Opponent-Negative only ads).

3.1 Hypothesis One: The Cognitive component (Ad-C) and the Affective component (Ad-A) of Ad Attitude ($A_{ad}$) will be present and statistically different from one another.

3.2 Hypothesis Two: For Sponsor-Positive print advertising, both the Cognitive component (Ad-C) of Ad Attitude ($A_{ad}$) and the Affective component (Ad-A) will be statistically different from the Cognitive and Affective components of the Sponsor-Positive television ad.

3.3 Hypothesis Three: For Opponent-Negative print advertising, both the Cognitive component (Ad-C) of Ad Attitude ($A_{ad}$) and the Affective component (Ad-A) will be statistically different from the Cognitive and Affective components of the Opponent-Negative television ad.
4. Methodology

4.1 Instrument
Respondents were shown either a representative television commercial broadcast by one of the two presidential candidates or given a simulated print advertisement. With the print ads, a cover sheet and a pencil and paper questionnaire were attached. With those shown a television commercial, the same questionnaire was completed afterward.

Respondents had an equal chance of receiving one of these four ad treatments – Print or Television, Positive or Negative ad. For this study, these four treatments are examined. Ads from both Republican and Democratic candidates were presented, but were not examined separately.

For both print and television, Positive ads were composed of sponsor-positive statements only and Negative ads were composed of opponent-negative statements only. Print ads were simulated, but represented actual statements made by the candidates and were analogous to the ones made in the television ads. This was designed to better match the tone and content of the print ads to the tone and content of the television commercials.

4.2 Subjects
A convenience sample of 278 business and non-business undergraduate students at a Midwestern state university participated. This population is the type used most often in ad attitude studies (Moore and Rodgers, 2005; Brown and Stayman, 1992; Pinkleton, Um, and Austin, 2002). Within this convenience sample, the students were assigned randomly to one of the four message treatments: positive or negative ad, and print or television ad.

4.3 Aad Measurement
Ad attitude was measured following the scaling built on the previous ad attitude studies discussed below. Cronbach’s Alpha was used to provide evidence of reliability and then factor analysis was used to discover and develop the multiple scaling items discussed below.

Affective Measurement
The survey instrument investigated subjects’ attitudes toward the ads using a series of 5-point bipolar scale items developed by Mitchell and Olson (1981); Lutz, et. al.(1983); Hill and Mazis (1985); and Hill (1989). The items were labeled “good – bad,” “like – dislike,” “irritating – nonirritating,” “favorable – unfavorable,” “pleasant – unpleasant,” “nice – awful,” “sensitive – insensitive,” and “tasteful – tasteless.” While these items represented the Aad scale as a global construct in Hill (1989) and Mitchell and Olson (1981), they were used to only represent the affective component of attitude (e.g., Robideaux 1998, 2002) used for hypothesis testing.

4.4 Cognitive Measurement
The cognitive construct, representing thinking and beliefs toward the ad, is also a subcomponent of the overall ad attitude. Three scales, “interesting – uninteresting,” (Hill, 1989) “believable – unbelievable” and “informative – not informative” (Tinkham and Weaver-Lariscy, 1994) were used to measure the content-relevant cognitive dimension.

All response scales alternated the position of the positive and negative polar adjective to reduce measurement error. The items were coded so that the middle position of the 5-point scale was neutral, or zero. This allowed one to read the scale as +1 or +2 as positive and very positive, and -1 or -2 as negative and very negative.

4.5 Composite Scales
Guided by the factor analysis grouping of the bi-polar scales, construct means of summated scores were developed (e.g., Mitchell and Olson 1981) for the Affective and Cognitive constructs of Aad. As described above, because the 5-point item scales used the midpoint as zero, the construct means could be positive or negative, reflecting the overall, or mean, directional responses of the construct. These construct means were used for the subsequent testing of hypotheses.

6. Testing Results
Hypothesis One was seeking to verify that the two constructs of Ad Attitude presented themselves and whether the two constructs were statistically different. As one can see from Chart One, the Cognitive dimension and the Affective dimension for both the print and the television ads are demonstrably different. Factor analysis was used to verify that the grouping of the multi-item scales were the same as the earlier studies cited.
For the Sponsor-Positive ads, the Cognitive and Affect dimensions were statistically different from one another. Also, those Affective and Cognitive dimensions were statistically different at the 0.05 significance level for both the print ads and the television ads. However, for the Opponent-Negative ads, the Ad Attitude subcomponents were not statistically different from one another for either the print or television ads.

Examining the direction of the means is illuminating. For Sponsor-Positive television commercials, the Cognitive, or believability, of the ad is in the negative territory. This indicates that the subjects viewed a candidate’s television ad, saying only positive things about himself, to be on the negative side of the scale. We also see this to a lesser degree on television’s Affect dimension when viewing an Opponent-Negative ad.

Hypothesis Two was looking for statistical differences between Sponsor-Positive ads for Print versus Television. Table One shows the results for both the affect (Ad-A) component of ad attitude and the cognitive (Ad-C) component of ad attitude. Hypothesis testing used MANOVA to analyze for statistically significant differences between the two media types. The means and Significance of the F-statistic are shown in Table One. Both Table One and Chart One illuminate the resulting direction and magnitude of the means. Again, a positive composite score mean indicates a positive reaction by subjects and a negative mean indicates a negative reaction by subjects. For Sponsor-Positive ads, the difference between print and television ads was not found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level for either the Cognitive or Affective Ad Attitude constructs.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Tone of Ad</th>
<th>TV Mean</th>
<th>Print Mean</th>
<th>Manova $f$</th>
<th>Sig Level</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cognitive (Ad-C)</td>
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<td>0.125000</td>
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<td>Affective (Ad-A)</td>
<td>0.427273</td>
<td>0.576116</td>
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<td>0.871</td>
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</table>

Hypothesis Three was looking for statistical differences between Opponent-Negative ads for Print versus Television. Table One shows the results for both the affect (Ad-A) component of ad attitude and the cognitive (Ad-C) component of ad attitude for the negative tone ads.

Hypothesis testing used MANOVA to analyze for statistically significant differences between the two media types. The means and Significance of the F-statistic are shown in Table One. Both Table One and Chart One illuminate the resulting direction and magnitude of the means. Again, a positive composite score mean indicates a positive reaction by subjects and a negative mean indicates a negative reaction by subjects. For Opponent-Negative ads, the difference between print and television ads was found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level for the Cognitive Ad Attitude construct but not the Affective Ad Attitude construct.
7. Discussion and Summary

Hypothesis One did find that the Affect and Cognitive subcomponents of Ad Attitude were still present and distinct from one another. They were also statistically different from one another for the Sponsor-Positive ads for both print and television. What we can conclude from Hypothesis One (Chart One) is that the Cognitive, or credible/believable/informational, ad attitude construct for Sponsor-Positive ads is negative for television. This indicates that subjects tend to find television ads, more so than print ads (although not statistically different), not believable when the politician’s ad says nothing but positive things about him/herself. But for both print and television ads, the subjects do have positive feelings about the ad. This offers the suggestion to political strategists that for Sponsor-Positive ads (particularly for those on television), don’t bother to present facts and information since they are not likely to be interpreted as credible. Stick to image-based ads designed to promote positive feelings toward your candidate.

Examination of Hypothesis One also showed that the Affect, or feeling-based, ad attitude construct for Opponent-Negative television ads was also negative. This provides some support for previous studies (e.g. Merritt, 1984; Hill, 1989) that concluded that subjects did not “like” negative political ads. One can also find here some tentative support for studies that concluded that even though subjects did not “like” the negative ads, they found them to be somewhat believable (e.g. Robideaux, 1998). This supports political strategists who continue to believe that regardless of liking or disliking negative political ads, these ads continue to provide information and to influence voters.

Hypothesis Two and Three were looking for differences between media for both Sponsor-Positive (Hypothesis Two) and Opponent-Negative ads (Hypothesis Three). The Positive tone ads’ Cognitive dimension approached the significance level but did not meet the 0.05 significance criteria. Certainly further investigation is warranted. The idea that on the Cognitive level, television ads were viewed as on the negative side of the believability scale and print ads on the positive side could have important implications for political strategists’ ad campaign decisions.

For Opponent-Negative ads (Hypothesis Three), statistically significant results were found for the Cognitive dimension. Television and Print ads were seen as statistically different on the credible/believable, Cognitive, ad attitude construct. These results indicate that when creating ads that will portray one’s political opponent in a negative light, subjects will interpret Print ads as the more believable. This result is partially supported by the Moore and Rodgers (2005) study that found that credibility for general newspaper ads were higher than general ads for television.

There are limitations of this study which should be noted. First, a convenience sample of students from a single geographic location was used. This limits generalizability to perhaps younger voters, but this group is very important. Earlier studies have indicated that younger voters’ trust of information and media sources is perhaps due to younger voters’ cynicism toward politicians (Merritt, 1984), the inherent trust of candidates and media (Sherman, et. al., 2012), or just the general cynicism of younger voters (Yoon, 1995). In any case, the study was looking for ad attitude effects and media differences in those effects and does not propose that the findings exist at similar levels with all voters.

Another limitation is the variation between political systems and any regulatory bodies governing the political or advertising process. Until negative political advertising increases to the levels found in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K., the ad attitude responses may not rise to the levels found in this study. And even here, differences in reactions to negative ads may exist between the U.S. and other countries (Murphy, 1996). Finally, the study examined the ad attitude constructs related to print and television advertising only – other media may elicit different responses.

The general cynicism toward politicians by voters may become a self-fulfilling conundrum – increasing levels of negative advertising leading to increased cynicism (Merritt, 1984) and doubts about the ability of the political process or government to solve problems (Zeller, 1991). Even if true, this cynicism has not yet come to a saturation point, to where one finds nothing believable in negative ads. But we may be getting very close to this point.
From this study, practitioners of political advertising may find some useful guidance. In the past, they could count on the negative ads to still have a cognitive/believability component that would possibly sway undecided voters as well as strengthen the commitment of their own party's voters. This study has shown that the believability (having a positive mean) cognitive component may no longer exist, especially for television ads.

This study has shown that the choice of medium may have a direct effect on Ad Attitude. More studies are needed to see if these results are consistent and robust. Negative political advertising will still have its adherents, and for differing tactical purposes. However, this study has indicated that the advertising medium may have an impact on the Ad Attitude evaluation for political ads. Negative advertising proponents may still claim that the ads are believable and informative, but this seems to be much less true for television commercials than print ads.

8. References


“Negative Political Ads 'Turn Off' UK Voters,” (2001), Marketing Week, March 8, 8.


